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Abstract. The idea of rejection originated by Aristotle. The notion of rejec-
tion was introduced into formal logic by Łukasiewicz [20]. He applied it to
complete syntactic characterization of deductive systems using an axiomatic
method of rejection of propositions [22, 23]. The paper gives not only genesis,
but also development and generalization of the notion of rejection. It also
emphasizes the methodological approach to biaspectual axiomatic method of
characterization of deductive systems as acceptance (asserted) systems and
rejection (refutation) systems, introduced by Łukasiewicz and developed by
his student Słupecki, the pioneers of the method, which becomes relevant in
modern approaches to logic.
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1. Introduction
The European logic as a science arose in 4th c. BC in ancient Greece. Aristotle is
thought to be the creator of logic. First of all, he is recognized as the creator of
the first formal–logic system, deductive system, the so called Aristotle’s syllogistic,
which together with the theory of immediate reasoning (square of opposition,
conversion, obversion, contraposition, inversion) is treated as traditional logic in a
narrower meaning. It is the logic of names.
The idea of rejection of some sentences on the basis of others was originated
by Aristotle, who in his systematic investigations regarding syllogistic forms not
only proves the proper (true) forms but also rejects the false (invalid, erroneous)
ones. Aristotle to reject some false syllogistic forms very often used examples, but
he also used another way of rejecting false forms by reducing them to other ones,
already rejected (see Łukasiewicz [22, 23]).
2 Urszula Wybraniec-Skardowska
The method of rejecting sentences always functioned in empirical sciences
in connection with the procedure of refutation of hypotheses, and we can assume
that it was also known to Stoics: because within the five ’unprovable’, hypothetical
syllogistic rules, their logic of sentences, formulated probably by Chrisippus, the
rule of deduction called in Latin modus tollendo tollens, or modus tollens (If p,
then q; not-q, so not-p) appears as the second one.
Although the method of rejection of sentences has always existed in empirical
science, in relation to the procedure of refutation of hypothesis, the Aristotle’s idea
of rejection of some sentences on the basis of the others has never been properly
understood by logicians or mathematicians, especially the ones convinced that
rejection of closed sentences of the language of deductive system can be always
replaced by introducing into such system the negation of such sentences.
The proper understanding of Aristotle’s ideas and implementation of the con-
cept of rejection into the formal researches on logical deductive systems (including
on Aristotle’s syllogistics) we owe to Jan Łukasiewicz – the co-founder of world fa-
mous Warsaw Logical School, which functioned in the interwar period (1918-1939).
Łukasiewicz and his pupil – Jerzy Słupecki are classified as pioneers of meta-logical
studies on the concept of rejection and related to it the notion of saturation (in
Słupecki’s terminology – Ł-decidability) of deductive systems.
The notion of rejection was introduced into formal logic by Łukasiewicz in
his work “Logika dwuwartościowa” (“Two-valued logic”) [20], in which, apart from
the term “assertion” (introduced by Frege), Łukasiewicz introduces also the term
“rejection”. In adding “rejection” to “assertion” he, as he states himself, followed
Brentano, but he did not mention any more about it. The notion of rejected
proposition later played an important role in his research on Aristotle’s syllogistic
[22, 23], as well as in his metalogical studies of some propositional calculi [24, 25].
In that research Łukasiewicz makes use of the idea of rejection originated
by Aristotle. Łukasiewicz applied it to complete a syntactical characterization of
deductive systems using an axiomatic method of rejection, introduced by him into
the formal logic in his paper on Aristotle’s syllogistic [22], and then, after the war,
in a monograph [23], which followed many years of research on Aristotelian logic,
and which included the results presented in the paper prepared before the war.
As was pointed out by Łukasiewicz (see [23, p.67]),
• Aristotle, in his systematic investigations of syllogistic forms, not only proves the
true ones but also shows that all the others are false, and must be rejected.
Further on (p.74), Łukasiewicz observes:
• Aristotle rejects invalid forms by exemplification through concrete terms. This pro-
cedure is logically correct, but it introduces into the systems terms and propositions
not germane to it. There are, however, cases where he applies a more logical pro-
cedure, reducing one invalid form to another already rejected. On the basis of this
remark, a rule of rejection could be stated corresponding to the rule of detachment
by assertion; this can be regarded as the commencement of a new field of logical
inquiries and of new problems that have to be solved.
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• Modern formal logic, as far as I know – writes Łukasiewicz (see [23, p.71]) – does not
use ‘rejection’ as an operation opposed to Frege’s ‘assertion’. The rules of rejection
are not yet known.
As a rule of rejection corresponding to the rule of detachment by assertion,
Łukasiewicz adopts [22, 23] the following rule, which was anticipated by Aristotle:
• the rule of rejection by detachment:
if the implication “If α, then β” is asserted, but its consequent β is
rejected, then its antecedent α must be rejected, too.
As a rule of rejection corresponding to the rule of substitution for assertion
Łukasiewicz adopts [22, 23] the following rule, which was unknown to Aristotle:
• the rule of rejection by substitution:
if β is a substitution instance of α, and β is rejected, then α must be
rejected, too.
Both rules enable us to reject some syllogistic forms, provided that some
other forms have already been rejected.
As we mentioned above, Aristotle used the procedure of rejection of some
forms by means of concrete terms, but such a procedure, though correct, introduces
into logic terms and propositions that are not germane to it.
To avoid this difficulty, Łukasiewicz rejects some forms axiomatically, which
leads him to biaspectual axiomatic characterization of deductive systems analyzed
by him [22–25]. The idea of rejection was first used by Łukasiewicz for two-level
syntactic description of Aristotle’s axiomatic system of syllogistics: as a system
with respect to acceptance (the first level) and as a system with respect to rejection
(the second level). The sentence rejected from the system he understood as a false
sentence, or a sentence which due to some reasons we cannot classify as a thesis
of this system. The idea of rejection was used by Łukasiewicz while studying the
decidability (saturation) of the system: each sentence, which is not the thesis of a
decidable (saturated) system, is rejected.
Reconstruction of concepts of rejection and decidability (saturation) used by
Łukasiewicz, was done by his pupil – Jerzy Słupecki [39, 40] (see also Słupecki et
al. [45]). Słupecki modified, developed and later generalized the concept of rejected
sentence, he also made its certain formalization. He also inspired systematic, formal
studies on this and related concepts, and also initiated research on the decidability
of many deductive systems.
In this paper1 I am starting from Słupecki’s and mine reconstruction of con-
cepts rejection and decidability – the notions introduced and used by Łukasiewicz
(Section 2).
Later on (Section 3), I am discussing the problem of decidability of Aristo-
tle’s syllogistic, set by Łukasiewicz, and I outline its solution given by Słupecki.
To follow with, I am describing Słupecki’s modification and generalization of the
concept of rejection and also presenting the importance of Słupecki’s research on
1The paper is elaborated on the basis of my works [63–65] and Słupecki et al. [45].
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syllogistics for contemporary metalogic (Section 4). Later on, I am showing the
relation of idea of decidability in Łukasiewicz’s sense with the common concept of
decidability given by Słupecki, and I am discussing the decidability of more impor-
tant logical systems (Section 5). Finally, I am presenting Słupecki’s generalization
of the concept of rejection to the function of rejection, and its formalization in the
theory of rejected sentences (Section 6). The final notes relate to presentation of
different than Łukasiewicz’s way of two-level formalization of deductive systems
(Section 7).
2. Reconstruction of Concepts of Rejection and Decidability – the
notions introduced and used by Łukasiewicz
The notion of decidability of the deductive system that was used by Łukasiewicz in
his research on Aristotle’s syllogistic [22, 23] and systems of propositional calculi
[24, 25] is based on the notion of a rejected sentence introduced by him.
The main idea of a syntactic biaspectual characterization of deductive sys-
tems in Łukasiewicz’s sense is compatible with providing both:
• the axioms and inference rules for the given deductive system, which intu-
itively lead from some true formulas to true ones of this system
and
• the rejected axioms (treated as false formulas of this system) and rejection
(refutation) rules of this system, which intuitively lead from some false for-
mulas to false ones of this system.2
Łukasiewicz used the terms ‘decidable system’ and ‘consistent system’ in the
meaning different from the one accepted in logic. Łukasiewicz does not give clear
definitions of these terms, but the context points out that he used them in the
following meaning:
• The system is decidable if every its expression which is not its thesis is rejected
on the ground of finite number of axiomatically rejected expressions;
• The system is consistent if none of its thesis is rejected.
Łukasiewcz did not use the term ‘decidable system’ consequently. He also
employed interchangeably the terms ‘saturated system’ or ‘categorical system’.
In nomenclature introduced by Słupecki, decidability of a deductive system
in Łukasewicz’s sense was called Ł-decidability and its consistency was called Ł-
consistency.
The meaning of the term ‘decidable system’ compatible with the understand-
ing of the notion of a decidable system by Łukasiewicz gives the following definition:
• The deductive system determined by means of the ordered triple:
2Such a syntactic formalization of some propositional calculi was also, probably independently,
introduced by Rudolf Carnap [6, 7]; see Citkin [10].
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〈F,A,R〉
where F is the set of all well-formed formulas of this system, A is the set of its
axioms and R is the set of its primitive inference rules, is Ł-decidable if and only if
there exist finite sets: the set A−1 of rejected axioms (included in F ) and the set
R−1 of primitive rejected rules, such that the following two conditions are satisfied:
I. T ∩ T−1 = ∅ and II. T ∪ T−1 = F,
where T is the set of all theses of the system, T−1 is the set of all rejected formulas
(the smallest set including the set A−1 and closed with respect to every relation
determined by rejected rules of the set R−1).
The conditions I and II we call, respectively, Ł-consistency of the deductive
system and Ł-completeness of the system.
Characterizing the deductive system by means of tuples
〈F,A,R;A−1, R−1〉 or 〈F, T ;T−1〉,
the definition given above can be defined as follows:
The deductive system is Ł-decidable if and only if the following conditions
are satisfied:
I. the set of all its theses (asserted expressions) determining the system is dis-
joined with the set of all its rejected formulas,
II. every propositional formula is either asserted or rejected.
3. The Problem of Decidability of Aristotle’s Syllogistics, Set by
Łukasiewicz, and its Solution Given by Słupecki
3.1. Łukasiewicz’s biaspectual formalization of Aristotelian Logic AS
On the first level AS is characterized as follows (cf. Łukasiewicz [21]):
The Vocabulary of AS:
• constant symbols of classical logic CL, i.e., the connectives of CL,
• primitive terms of AS: constants a and i which are sentence forming functors
of two-term arguments: ‘all . . . are . . . ’ and ‘some . . . are . . . ’,
• nominal variables: S, P , M , N , . . . .
Well-formed Expressions of AS:
• atomic affirmative expressions: formulas of the form of S a P and S i P , which
are read: ‘all S are P ’, ‘some S are P ’, respectively, compound expressions:
formulas that are created from the atomic ones using the connectives of CL,
• the set F of all well-formed expressions – the smallest set of formulas including
the atomic expressions and closed under the connectives of CL.
Defined Terms of AS:
• the remaining constants of Aristotelian logic: e and o,
i.e. the functors: ‘no . . . are . . . ’ and ‘some . . . are not . . . ’ which are defined
as follows:
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D1. S e P df= ∼S i P ,
D2. S o P df= ∼S a P .
The negative expressions S e P and S o P are read, respectively: ‘no S are
P ’ and ‘some S are not P ’. Apart from the atomic expressions, we include them
into the so called simple expressions.
Axioms of AS:
A+1. S a S,
A+2. S i S,
A+3. M a P ∧ S a M → S a P (Barbara),
A+4. M a P ∧ M i S → S i P (Datisi).
Axioms A+1 and A+2 are the two laws of identity; Aristotle did not accept
them.
Primitive Inference Rules for AS:
rŁˆ: the rule of definitional replacement
(according to D1, S e P may be everywhere replaced by ∼S i P , and, ac-
cording to D2, S o P may be everywhere replaced by ∼S a P );
r+1: the rule of detachment (modus ponens)
(if ‘α→ β’ and α are asserted expressions of a system, then β is an asserted
expression);
r+2: the rule of substitution
(if α is an asserted expression of the system, then any expression produced
from α by a valid substitution is also an asserted expression; the valid sub-
stitution is to put, for term-variables, other term-variables).
The schemes of the rules r+1 and r+2 are as follows:
r+1: ` α→ β r+2:
` α ` α
` β ` e(α)
The symbol ‘`’ is a sign of assertion introduced by Frege, whereas, the ex-
pression ‘e(α)’ denotes a substitution instance of α.
Characterization of the system AS on the second level consists in supple-
menting it with rejected axioms and rejection rules.
Łukasiewicz formulates the following rejected axioms and rejection rules:
Rejected Axioms of AS:
A−1. P a M ∧ S a M → S i P ,
A−2. P e M ∧ S e M → S i P .
Primitive Rejection Rules for AS:
r−1: the rule of rejection by detachment (reverse modus ponens),
r−2: the rule of rejection by substitution.
The schemes of the rules are the following:
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r−1: ` α→ β r−2:
a β a e(α)
a α a α
The symbol ‘a’ is the sign of rejection.
The characterized system AS is determined by the following ordered 5-tuple,
which may be called the basis of AS:
〈F,A+, R+;A−, R−〉, (B)
where F is the set of all well-formed formulas of this system; A+ – the set of its
axioms; R+ – the set of its primitive inference rules; A− – the set of its rejected
axioms, and R− – the set of its primitive rejection rules. The tuples
〈F,A+, R+〉 and 〈F,A−, R−〉
determine, respectively, the set T+ of all theses of this system and the set T− of
all its rejected formulas.
The first tuple may be called the assertion system for AS, whereas, the second
one may be called the refutation system for AS.
• T+ is the set of all well-formed formulas derivable from the set of theses of
metalogically formulated CL and axioms of A+ by means of inference rules
of R+, while
• T− is the set of all well-formed formulas derivable from the rejected axioms
A− by means of theses of T+ and rejection (refutation) rules of R−. So
T+ = Cn+(CL ∪A+, R+),
and T+ is the smallest set including CL∪A+ and closed under the inference rules
of R+.
T− = Cn−(T+ ∪A−, R−), D(Ł)
and T− is the smallest set including A− and closed under the rejection rules of
R−. The set T− is the set of all rejected expressions of the system in Łukasiewicz’s
sense.
To the set T+ there also belong all 24 valid syllogistic forms, the laws of logical
square and the laws of conversion, and, to the set T− of all rejected formulas, there
belong all the remaining 232 invalid forms. However, it turned out that there exists
such well-formed expression of AS, which is neither a thesis of this system nor a
rejected expression of the set T−. Such, for example, is the formula:
S i P → (∼S a P ∧ P a S). (Fl)
In order to remove this difficulty, we could reject the expression (Fl) axiomatically.
However, a question arises whether there exists some other formula of the same
kind as (Fl), or, may be, an infinite number of such formulas, which can be called
undecidable on the strength of our basis (B). Therefore, we may only claim that
the following condition holds:
T+ ∪ T− ⊂ F.
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3.2. The problem of Ł-decidability of AS
The system AS whose basis is (B) analyzed by us, is not saturated or decidable in
the sense that it is both 1◦ Ł-consistent and 2◦ Ł-complete, i.e.
1◦ T+ ∩ T− = ∅ and 2◦ T+ ∪ T− = F .
As we know, a system satisfying both conditions was called by Słupecki an
Ł-decidable system (see Sec.2).
The problem concerning the finite Ł-decidability of Aristotelian syllogistic
was raised by Łukasiewicz in December 1937, during his seminar on Mathematical
Logic at the University of Warsaw.
Łukasiewicz presented the problem in the form of the following questions:
Q1. Are the axioms of A+ for AS together with the inference rules of R+ for AS
sufficient to prove all true expressions of the AS?
Q2. Are the rules of rejection of R− = {r−1, r−2} for AS sufficient to reject all
false expressions (every formula of F that is not a thesis of T+), provided
that a finite number of them are rejected axiomatically?
3.3. Słupecki’s Solution of the Problem of Ł-decidability of AS
Jerzy Słupecki, who participated in Łukasiewicz’s seminar, solved in 1938 the
problem providing a basis for which the system of Aristotelian syllogistic is Ł-
decidable (see Łukasiewicz [22, 23]). His answer to the question Ql was positive;
to the second one, negative.
Słupecki was able to prove that it is not possible to reject all the false ex-
pressions of AS by means of the rules r−1 and r−2, provided a finite number of
them is rejected axiomatically.
This way Słupecki gave a negative answer to the question Q2:
(i) The system AS with the basis (B) is not Ł-complete with any finite set of
rejected axioms of A−.
Słupecki extended the system AS, adding to it a new rejection rule, called by
Łukasiewicz Słupecki’s rule of rejection. It is denoted by r−S and has the following
scheme:
r−S: a α→ γ
a β → γ
a α ∧ β → γ
where α and β denote negative expressions in the form: S e P or S o P and γ
denotes a simple expression or an implication the consequent of which is a simple
expression and the antecedent, a conjunction of such expressions.
The Słupecki’s rule says: If the expression γ does not follow from any of two
negative expressions then it does not follow from their conjunction.
Słupecki’s rule is closely related to the principle of traditional logic (ex mere
negative nihil sequitur).
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As was noticed by Łukasiewicz, having added Słupecki’s rule, it is enough to
adopt merely one rejected axiom, namely, A−1.
Słupecki demonstrated that:
(ii) System of Aristotle’s syllogistic determined by the following base:
〈F,A+, R+; {A−1}, R− ∪ {r−S}〉 (BS)
with the refutation system:
(iii) 〈F, {A−1}, R− ∪ {r−S}〉,
is Ł-decidability system, i.e.
1◦ T+ ∩ T−S = ∅ and 2◦ T+ ∪ T−S = F , where
T−S = Cn−(T+ ∪ {A−1}, R− ∪ {r−S}), D(Ł)
is the set of all rejected propositions, i.e. the set of propositions derivable from the
axiom A−1 by means of the thesis of AS and Łukasiewicz’s rejection rules and
Słupecki’s rejection rule.
And the problem of Ł-decidability of AS has been solved: any well-formed
formula of AS is either a thesis or is a rejected formula of AS.
It is clear that Słupecki extended the notion of the rejected proposition used
by Łukasiewicz, because:
T− ⊂ T−S . D(Ł) ⊂ D(Ł)
The results obtained by Słupecki were summarized by Łukasiewicz in his
work [22] containing also the text of his paper on Aristotle’s syllogistic.
The results of research of both Łukasiewicz and Słupecki were later, after
the war, presented in detail in Łukasiewicz’s monograph [23]. In both works Łu-
kasiewicz expressed his high opinion of Słupecki’s findings, which, in the words of
Łukasiewicz [22] were
“organically united with researches of the author . . . the author regards
as the most significant discovery made in the field of syllogistic since
Aristotle.”
3.4. Słupecki’s Definiton of a Rejected Proposition
Słupecki failed to publish his findings before the war. After the war ends, Słupecki
published them in [38] and in a monograph [39]. In the monograph [39], in his
proof of Ł-completeness (condition (ii), 2◦), he also used a definition of the re-
jected proposition different than Łukasiewicz D(Ł), and additionally, he modified
its extension D(Ł), adopted earlier by himself. Instead of Łukasiewicz’s definition
D(Ł), Słupecki adopts the following equivalent definition:
D(Sł). A rejected proposition on the ground of the basis
〈F,A+, R+;A−, ∅〉, (B \R−)
is such an expression for which there exists a rejected axiom of the set A− which
is derivable from it and theses of the set T+ by means of inference rules of R+.
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Denoting a set of all rejected propositions in the sense of the definition D(Sł)
by Cn−1(T+ ∪A−, R+), we obtain the following symbolic notation of it:
α ∈ Cn−1(T+ ∪A−, R+)⇔ ∃β ∈ A−(β ∈ Cn+(T+ ∪ {α}, R+)), D(Sł)
where Cn+ is a consequence operation with respect to the set T+ of all theses of
the system and its set of rules R+.
The definition of a rejected proposition D(Sł) is closer to Aristotle’s idea of
refutation of syllogisms by means of reducing them to syllogisms rejected earlier.
We note (see D(Ł)) that:
T− = Cn−(T+ ∪A−, R−) = Cn−1(T+ ∪A−, R+). D(Ł) ≈ D(Sł)
Thus, the notions of rejected propositions, both the one used by Łukasiewicz
and that introduced by Słupecki in the form of the definition D(Sł), are equivalent.
3.5. Słupecki’s Definition of an Extended Notion of Rejected Proposition
We will reconstruct Słupecki’s definition of an extended notion of the rejected
proposition, equivalent to the definition D(Ł).
D(Sł). A rejected proposition on the ground of the basis
〈F,A+, R+; {A−1}, {r−S}〉 (BSł)
is either a rejected axiom A−1 or a proposition rejected with respect to those re-
jected earlier in the sense of D(Sł; A−/X), or an expression rejected on the basis
of those rejected earlier, by means of using Słupecki’s rule.
Let Cn ′(T+ ∪ {A−1}, R+; {r−S}) be the set of all rejected propositions in
the sense of D(Sł). We may note that
T−S = Cn−(T+ ∪ {A−1}, R− ∪ {r−S}) = Cn ′(T+ ∪ {A−1}, R+; {r−S}).
D(Ł) ≈ D(Sł)
3.6. Three Different Ways of Understanding the Notion of Rejected Proposition
It is easy to see that the given definitions of rejected propositions provide three
different ways of understanding this notion:
D(Sł) ⊂ D(Sł). Cn−1(T+ ∪A−, R+) ⊂ Cn ′(T+ ∪ {A−1}, R+; {r−S})
‖ ‖
T− T−S
‖ ‖
D(Ł) ⊂ D(Ł). Cn−(T+ ∪A−, R−) ⊂ Cn−(T+ ∪ {A−1}, R− ∪ {r−S})
The first of them refers to Łukasiewicz’s understanding of the rejected propo-
sition (see D(Ł)) and to its strengthening given by Słupecki (see D(Ł)); the second
and the third ones, to Słupecki’s understanding of the rejected proposition (see
D(Sł) and D(Sł). At the same time, the second one refers directly to Aristotle’s
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method of rejection of syllogisms by reducing them to previously rejected syllo-
gisms and makes it possible to simplify the procedure of rejection without supple-
menting the system with the rules of rejection, and the third one (see D(Sł)) is a
combination of both former methods.
4. Notions of Rejection in a Deductive System and Notions of
Ł-decidability
4.1. Three Different Notions of Rejection
We are adapting the previous definitions of rejection for AS for any deductive
system.
Let S be any deductive system with biaspectual formalization and with the
basis
〈FS , A+S , R+S ;A−S , R−S ∪R′S〉 (BS)
determined, respectively, by computable sets: the set FS of all well-formed formu-
las, the set A+S of axioms (asserted axioms), the set R
+
S of inference rules, the set
A−S of rejected axioms and by the set R
−
S ∪R′S of rejection rules, with an assump-
tion that the sets R+S and R
−
S are sets of mutual dual rules, while the set R
′
S is a
set of non-dual rejection rules.
Let T+S be a set of all theses of S. Then, according to Łukasiewicz’s concep-
tion, on the analogy to D(Ł),
the set 1T−S of all rejected propositions of S, with respect to the set T
+
S and the
basis (BS) (the refutation system 〈FS , A−S , R−S ∪R′S〉) is defined as follows:
1T−S = Cn
−
S (T
+
S ∪A−S , R−S ∪R′S) DS(Ł)
And 1T−S is a set of all formulas with rejection proofs in Łukasiewicz’s sense, i.e.
it is a set of all formulas derivable from rejected axioms of A−S by means of theses
of T+S and rejection rules of R
−
S ∪ R′S ; i.e. 1T−S is the smallest set including A−S
and closed under the rejection rules of R−S ∪R′S .
If R′S = ∅, the basis (BS) of the system S can be replaced by the basis
〈FS , A+S , R+S ;A−S , ∅〉 (BS \R−S )
and the set 2T−S of all rejected propositions of S with respect to the set T
+
S and
the basis (BS \R−S ), on the analogy to D(Sł), is defined as follows:
2T−S = Cn
−1
S (T
+
S ∪A−S , R+S ) DS(Sł)
and 2T−S is a set of all propositions with rejection proofs in Słupecki’s sense, i.e. it
is a set of all such formulas from which, and from theses of T+S , and by means of
inference rules of R+S a rejected axiom of A
−
S is derivable.
If R′S 6= ∅, the basis (BS) can be replaced by the basis
〈FS , A+S , R+S ;A−S , R′S〉 (BS)
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and the set 3T−S of all rejected propositions of S with respect to the set T
+
S and
the basis (BS), on the analogy to D(Sł), can be defined as follows:
3T−S = Cn
′
S(T
+
S ∪A−S , R+S ;R′S) DS(Sł)
and the set 3T−S is a set of rejected propositions with rejected proofs in Słupecki-
Łukasiewicz’s sense, i.e. it is a set of all such propositions every one of which is
either:
1◦ a rejected axiom of A−S , or 2
◦ a proposition rejected with respect to those
rejected earlier in Słupecki’s sense, or 3◦ a proposition rejected on the basis of
those rejected earlier by means of rejection rules of R′S .
Let us note that the given above definitions DS(Ł), DS(Sł) and DS(Sł) are
in some extent a simplification and require the precise definitions of the above-
mentioned rejection proofs on the basis of any setX ⊆ FS , with respect to the bases
(BS), (BS \R−S ) and (BS) (see Słupecki [43], Słupecki and Bryll [44], Wybraniec-
Skardowska [63, 64]).
Let us observe that among the set of rejected propositions defined above, the
following relationships hold:
a. If R′S = ∅ then 2T−S = 1T−S b. 2T−S ⊆ 1T−S = 3T−S .
4.2. Three Different Notions of Ł-decidability; Decidability
The three different definitions of the sets of rejected propositions of the system S
entail three different definitions of Ł-decidability of this system.
Definition: The system S is Ł-decidable if and only if, for some i = 1, 2, 3, S is
iŁ-decidable, i.e. it satisfies the two following conditions:
1◦ T+S ∩ iT−S = ∅, 2◦ T+S ∪ iT−S = FS .
The condition 1◦ is called iŁ-consistence condition and the condition 2◦ is
called iŁ-completeness condition of the system S.
A question arises: What the relationship between Ł-decidability and decid-
ability in the usual sense is? The answer was given by J. Słupecki.
Słupecki’s Theorem [43]: If the system S is Ł-decidable and any rejection rule,
except for the rule of rejection by detachment, is computable, then the system S is
decidable in the usual meaning.3
It is easy to show that
Corollary: The system AS of Aristotle’s syllogistic with the bases (BSŁ) is decid-
able.
In the next section we will present Ł-decidable systems that are also decid-
able.
3Słupecki’s theorem is an immediate consequence of the following theorem of the theory recursion,
which we quote from Grzegorczyk’s book [14, p.355 in the Eng. ed.]: If the union of two recursively
enumerable disjoint sets T and S is computable set, then the sets T and S are also computable.
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5. More Important Findings Concerning Ł-decidability of Deductive
Systems
The axiomatic rejection method introduced by Lukasiewicz to complete, biaspec-
tual characterization of deductive systems (which was effectively used and devel-
oped by Słupecki) provided a broad response in literature after the Second World
War. Łukasiewicz, already living in Dublin, uses such method in his research on
intuitionistic logic [24], as well as in a four-valued modal system of propositional
calculus [25], built by himself. At the same time, in Poland, further studies, in-
spired by Słupecki on Ł-decidability of deductive systems and the very notion
of rejected proposition were taken up. In studies on Ł-decidability and providing
complete refutation systems for logical systems (assertion systems) one of three
methods, modeled on those described in the previous section, is usually used. In
the next subsections we will present a few, more important results, connected with
this research.4
5.1. Calculi of Names
J. Słupecki’s research on Aristotle’s syllogistic was continued mainly by B. Iwanuś.
Using the Słupecki-Łukasiewicz’s methods, Iwanuś managed to prove Ł-decidability
of a few systems of calculi of names.
• Iwanuś [17] gave a proof of Ł-decidability of the whole traditional calculus of
names, i.e. the system of Aristotle’s syllogistic enriched by nominal negation.
• Another interesting, though much later obtained result of Iwanuś’s research
[18] is a proof of Ł-decidability of the system of Aristotle’s syllogistic built
by Słupecki [38]. In this system, the two initial Łukasiewicz’s axioms (laws
of identity) of the system AS (those that are absent in Aristotle’s logic) are
replaced with the following axioms:
S a P ⇒ S i P, S i P ⇒ P i S.
In Słupecki’s system, unlike in the system AS, it is permissible for variables
to represent empty names. A complete refutation system for the system given
by Iwanuś [18] is based on three rejected axioms and one rejected rule that
is germane to the traditional calculus of names.
• Iwanuś also, in [16], gave a proof of Ł-decidability of a certain version of
elementary ontology, distinguished from the system of Leśniewski’s Ontology
(both terms were invented by Słupecki in [41], who presented a system of
calculus of names, based on Leśniewski’s findings). In elementary ontology
it is possible to interpret both the asserted system AS and other asserted
syllogistic systems richer than AS, with nominal negation. Iwanuś gave a
complete refutation system for the version of the system of elementary ontol-
ogy; Iwanuś’s refutation system consist of two independent rejected axioms
and one non-Łukasiewicz’s specific rejection rule.
4G. Bryll (as well as his book [2]) and T. Skura have been very helpful in verifying certain
significant facts.
14 Urszula Wybraniec-Skardowska
5.2. Propositional Logic
As we have already mentioned, Łukasiewicz used to apply the axiomatic method
of rejection also to some systems of propositional calculus.
5.2.1. Classical logic. Łukasiewicz mentioned in [25], that the classical proposi-
tional calculus with the inference rules r+1 and r+2 is Ł-decidable. A complete
refutation system for it determines one rejected axiom, namely the sentential vari-
able p, and two Łukasiewicz’s rules: r−1 and r−2.
Let us note that the method of rejection of false formulas (i.e. non-theses)
used by Łukasiewicz can be replaced by Słupecki’s method, omitting Łukasiewicz’s
rules, i.e. applying the following principle: If, from a formula of propositional cal-
culus and the set of theses, it is possible to deduce, according to the rules r+1 and
r+2, the rejected axiom p, then the formula is rejected (see D(Sł)).
For the classical first-order calculus rejected axioms and rejected rules were
formulated by T. Skura in [32]. Skura made use of the ‘tableaux’ method.
The rejection procedure accompanying the syntactic characterization of sys-
tems of propositional logic became a standard among logicians.
We will limit our presentation of results in the scope of the rejection procedure
in the systems to a brief mention of only intuitionistic logic and extensions, modal
logic and Łukasiewicz’s logics.
5.2.2. Intuitionistic logic and extensions. In his research on intuitionistic propo-
sitional calculus, Łukasiewicz [24] advanced the hypothesis that it is Ł-decidable.
Moreover, he supposed that a sole rejected axiom of it is a propositional variable,
and that the rejection rules are: r−1, r−2 , and one special rule (Gödel rule) which
states that the disjunction α ∨ β is rejected whenever so are α and β. Thanks
to Kreisel-Putnam [19], we know that the rules proposed by Łukasiewicz do not
suffice to reject all non-theses of the intuitionistic calculus. It is also known that
there is no finite set of rejected axioms that, together with Łukasiewicz’s rules,
gives a complete refutation of intuitionistic system (cf. Maduch [28]).
Ł-decidability of the intuitionistic propositional logic was achieved by D. Scott
[29] using a countable number of non-structural rejection rules. However, Scott’s
results, which were presented in Summaries of Talks at Cornell University, were
inaccessible to Słupecki’s circle in behind the Iron Curtain (then) Poland.
Independently of Scott’s results, the proof of Ł-decidability of the intuition-
istic propositional calculus was provided by R. Dutkiewicz [11]. In his approach,
a complete refutation intuitionistic system is compounded of one axiom and three
rejection rules: Łukasiewicz’s rules, and a new, original rejection rule, which is,
in fact, an infinite countable class of rejection rules of a common scheme. In his
proof, Dutkiewicz uses the method of rejection modeled on the one applied by
Łukasiewicz, as well as the method of Beth’s semantic tableaux.
Another proof of Ł-decidability for the intuitionistic calculus was given by
Skura [30, 36], who, while defining a complete intuitionistic refutation system,
added to Łukasiewicz’s rules a new rule, or rather, a class of structural rules
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of rejection, the number of which is infinite. Skura in [31], provided a complete
refutation system for certain intermediate logics.
5.2.3. Modal logic. The first research into a complete syntactic characterization
of a modal propositional calculus was undertaken by Łukasiewicz [25]: he extends
the four-valued modal system, built by himself, by two rejected axioms and his
rejection rules, obtaining Ł-decidability of this system.
Afterwards, Słupecki initiated research on Ł-decidability of Lewis system S5.
In his and Bryll’s paper [44], the proof of Ł-decidability was achieved with an
assumption of one rejected axiom (the prepositional variable p) and, apart from
Łukasiewicz’s rules, a class of rejection rules of the common scheme.
Skura [31, 32, 34] gave a simpler proof of Ł-decidability of Lewis system S5,
assuming that the language of this system was supplemented with a symbol ‘⊥’,
i.e. the constant of falsity. Skura adopts this constant as the rejected axiom and
extends the systems of Łukasiewicz’s rules by: 1) a rule stating that: if formula
¤p is rejected, the formula p is rejected, too; and 2) a class of structural rejection
rules of the same scheme.
Skura in [31, 35, 36], using the algebraic method, also provided a complete
refutation system for the logic S4 and for some of its extension (Grzegorczyk’s
logic).
A little earlier, V. Goranko [12, 13] formulated a complete refutation system
for some normal modal propositional logics (including S4 and Grzegorczyk’s logic)
that are characterized by a class of finite trees. His refutation systems for these
logics are based on the same rejected axiom (the constant ‘⊥’), Łukasiewicz’s rules,
and a class of non-structural rejected rules of the same scheme.
The method of constructing refutation systems corresponding to classes of
finite models was used by Skura [31] for intermediate logics and, by Skura [33]
and Goranko [13], for certain normal modal logics. Skura in [33], showed that the
refutation systems can be useful in such cases when a given system of logic cannot
be characterized by any class of finite models: there is a decidable modal logic
without a finite model property that has a simple refutation system.
Tomasz Skura is regarded as an expert on the methods in refutation systems;
his book [37] is devoted to refutation methods in modal propositional logics.
5.2.4. Łukasiewicz’s many-valued logics. Researches into Ł-decidability of Łuka-
siewicz’s sentential calculus were conducted in the Opole circle of logical research,
which, for many years, was led by Jerzy Słupecki. G. Bryll and M. Maduch [3],
formulated a uniform method of rejection of formulas in an n+ 1-valued implica-
tional, implicative-negative and definitionally complete Łukasiewicz’s calculus. In
these systems the same formula may be adopted as the sole rejected axiom5
C(Cp)nq(Cp)n−1q
5It is saved in Łukasiewicz’s, so called Polish notation.
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(for n = 1 we get, in particular, the rejected axiom: CCpqq in the classical impli-
cational calculus). The only rejection rules are, here, Łukasiewicz’s rules.
A complete refutation system for ℵ0-valued Łukasiewicz’s calculus was built
by Skura [32] by extension of Łukasiewicz’s rejection rules. Research into Ł-decida-
bility of this system has been also conducted by Bryll [2]. His research was con-
tinued by R. Sochacki.
R. Sochacki [50] gave complete refutation systems for all invariant Łuka-
siewicz’s many-valued logics (in which the rule of rejection by substitution was
eliminated; see also Sochacki [48], Bryll and Sochacki [4, 5].
Sochacki also built refutation systems for selected many-valued logics: the
k-valued logic of Sobociński and some systems of nonsense logic [49, 51].
5.3. The Generalized Method of Natural Deduction
The method of rejection introduced to metalogical investigations by Łukasiewicz in
many cases can be replaced with the generalized method of natural deduction. The
latter is applicable to all propositional calculi which have finite adequate matrices,
as well as to the intuitionistic propositional calculus and the first-order predicate
calculus, that is, to almost all logics discussed in this section.
The basis for such systems consists then of only assertion rules and rejection
rules; the sets asserted and the rejected axioms are empty sets. The method used
in the proofs is similar to Słupecki-Łukasiewicz’s method of rejection, though they
are apagogic proofs (by reductio ad absurdum).
This method refers to the ‘tableaux’ method. It is presented by Bryll [2], who
in his studies refers to results obtained by Hintikka [15], Smullyan [47], Suchoń [54],
Surma [55, 56] and Carnielli [8, 9].
6. Rejection Operation
As was noticed by Słupecki, the notion of rejected proposition is so general that
it is most convenient to base studies concerning this notion on Tarski’s theory of
deductive systems, i.e. the axiomatic theory of consequence built by Alfred Tarski
[57]. Let us recall that the only primitive notions of this theory are:
• the set F of all propositions (well-formed formulas) of an arbitrary but fixed
language of a given system and the consequence operation:
Cn+ : 2F → 2F ;
• the symbol ‘Cn+(X)’ denotes the set of all consequences of the set X ⊆ F .
Properties of deductive systems characterized by the bases with refutation
systems can be established by means of Tarski’s theory of consequence enriched
by the following definition of rejection operation:
Cn−1 : 2F → 2F ,
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determined by the consequence operation Cn+ (see D(Sł)): For any X ⊆ F, α ∈ F
α ∈ Cn−1(X)⇔ ∃β ∈ X(β ∈ Cn+({α})) MD(Sł)
According to the definition MD(Sł): a proposition α is a rejected proposition
on the ground of the set X if and only if at least one of the propositions of X is
derivable from (is a consequence of) α; the symbol ‘Cn−1(X)’ denotes the set of
all propositions rejected on the ground of propositions of X.
The following theorem helps to understand the intuitive sense of the definition
MD(Sł):
∀X ⊆ F (X ⊆ Y ⇒ Cn+(X) ⊆ Y )⇒ ∀X ⊆ F (X ⊆ Y ′ ⇒ Cn−1(X) ⊆ Y ′).
If Y is the set of all true propositions of F (then the set Y ′ is the set of all
false propositions of F ), then, according to the above theorem, we can state that:
If consequence operation always leads from true propositions to true propositions,
then a rejected operation always leads from false propositions to false propositions.
So, the defined rejection operation (function) Cn−1 is a generalization of the
notion of rejection introduced by Łukasiewicz.
The definition MD(Sł) of the function Cn−1 was formulated by Słupecki [42].
Słupecki proved that the function satisfies all axioms of Tarski’s general theory
of deductive systems [57] for the consequence Cn+ and that it is additive. Thus,
the rejected operation is another consequence operation and is called a rejection
consequence. It is clear that
Every deductive system with a bi-level formalization (with the assertion system and
the refutation system) can be characterized by the basis:
〈F,Cn+,Cn−1〉
and that the extension of Tarski’s theory of the definition MD(Sł) describes every
such system.
This theory has been developed in the form of the theory of rejected proposi-
tions by Wybraniec-Skardowska [62], and later also by Bryll [1]. Their researches
have been a continuation of investigations initiated by J. Słupecki and have been
conducted under his supervision to be later presented in co-authored papers (see
Słupecki et al. [45, 46].
The theory of rejected propositions contains many significant theorems that
are not counterparts of any theorem of Tarski’s theory [58]. The following are
examples of such theorems about the rejection operation Cn−1:
• Cn−1(∅) = ∅ – it is normal,
• Cn−1(⋃{X ⊆ G : G ⊆ F}) = ⋃{Cn−1(X) : X ⊆ G ⊆ F} – it is complete
additive,
• Cn−1(X) = ⋃{Cn−1({α}) : α ∈ X} – it is unit operation,
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• α ∈ Cn−1(X) ⇔ ∃β ∈ X(Cn−1({α} ⊆ Cn−1({β})) – it is a unit conse-
quence.
In the theory the following formulation of the rule of rejection by detachment
is valid:
• c αβ ∈ Cn+(X) ∧ β ∈ Cn−1(Y ∪X)⇒ α ∈ Cn−1(Y ∪X),
while in the Tarski’s theory the formulation of rule of detachment has the form:
• c αβ ∈ Cn+(Y ) ∧ α ∈ Cn+(Y ∪X)⇒ β ∈ Cn+(Y ∪X).
The set Y ⊆ F can be understood as a set of axioms A+ or the set of theses
T+ of a given deductive system.
7. Rejection Operation as a Primitive Notion
There is a possibility of the axiomatization of a theory of rejected propositions in
a dual and equivalent way, i.e. assuming that a primitive notion is the rejection
consequence Cn−1, while Cn+ is defined operation.
Such dual theory of rejected propositions was formulated by Wybraniec-
Skardowska [62](see also [67]). It can be understood as the theory describing the
deductive systems with the basis
〈F,Cn−1,Cn+〉.
A theory of rejected propositions was developed also to formalize some prob-
lems of methodology of empirical sciences, mainly by G. Bryll [1] (see also Słupecki
et al. [46]).
The theories of rejected propositions have a natural interpretation, which
was given by W. Staszek [53]: the set Cn−1(X) can be understood as a set of all
rejection proofs on the ground of a proposition of the set X, in the sense relating
to the nature of rejection proofs used by Słupecki in his researches on Aristotle’s
syllogistic.
In the theory of rejected propositions can be defined the notion of Ł-decidabi-
lity.
7.1. Rejection Operation as a Finitistic Consequence. Dual consequences
Rejection function Cn−1 can be generalized into a dual, finitistic consequence
in the usual meaning. The notion of the dual consequence dCn+ relating to the
consequence Cn+ was introduced by R. Wójcicki [61] by definition:
α ∈ dCn+(X)⇔ ∃Y ⊆ X ∧ card(Y ) < ℵ0(
⋂
{Cn+({β}) : β ∈ Y } ⊆ Cn+({α})).
The dual consequence dCn+ is stronger than the rejected consequence Cn−1
(i.e. Cn−1 ≤ dCn+), though the former is linked with the latter by a number of
interesting relationships (see Spasowski [52]).
Facts: a. dCn+1 = Cn−1 and b. dCn−1 = Cn+1,
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where the unit consequence Cn+1 is defined as follows:
α ∈ Cn+1(X)⇔ ∃β ∈ X(α ∈ Cn+({β}).
Certain studies of generalization of the notion of rejected expression in the
form of a function of a consequence of rejection or a dual consequence are disscused
by Wybraniec-Skardowska and Waldmajer [68].
The dual consequences Cn+ and dCn+ as well as Cn+1 and Cn−1 can be
used to study both true (asserted), and respectively, false (rejected) contents of a
given theory. The fact was noticed by J. Woleński [60] in his studies relating to
Popper’s conception of a comparison of scientific theories by their contents.
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